The moral argument for God in relation to necessary truths

One could say that the proposition, “Torturing children for fun.” is necessarily and seemingly obviously true.

Some theists have proposed that this means that the moral argument for God fails.

But I don’t see how this follows. It seems we would be assuming then that God doesn’t exist in every possible world because we are essentially saying that “Torturing children for fun” is true in worlds without God.

But the burden is on these theists is to show that God doesn’t necessarily (logically) exist in every possible world. It’s also assuming that necessary truths couldn’t reside in God’s mind or be a description of God’s mind.

“Torturing Children for fun is wrong,” does indeed seem obviously true and even necessarily. However, this still doesn’t answer the crucial question, “Why is it indeed wrong?!”

You could say that we don’t need any more justification as to why it’s wrong in order to be justified in believing it’s wrong.

But that still doesn’t answer de facto as to what the metaphysical foundations are for morality.

Is morality grounded in God, society, survival, emotions?

Are these alternatives outside of God plausible? They all seem to me to have serious flaws.

One could object that the Euthyphro dilemma could easily as well knock out the theistic account of morality. Personally, I’ve never been convinced of that dilemma. It is interesting nonetheless.


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