The Kalam Cosmological Argument is as follows:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause
2. The universe began to exist
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause
Problems with the Kalam Cosmological Argument:
1. It assumes the A-theory of time, which is not obviously true. In fact, it’s very controversial.
2. It assumes that “everything that begins to exist needs a cause” is a better principle than “everything that begins to exist needs a material and efficient cause”. The latter principle makes way more sense of our experiences, and it doesn’t reek of special pleading to make an argument. How does God creating out of nothing make any sense? If “out of nothing, nothing comes” then God surely isn’t exempt.
3. Even if the argument is sound, it doesn’t establish the existence of a being that we should care about. Heck, it doesn’t establish that such a being STILL exists! Even if the being established is a god, I don’t care. I only care about God, capital “G”. And even if you combine the Kalam argument with the moral argument, all you get is a powerful and good being, which isn’t a being worthy of worship. Last time I checked, “God” (in classical theism) is supposed to be all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good.
4. The big bang theory is usually cited as evidence for the premise that “the universe began to exist.” However, the big bang theory does not say that all physical reality began to exist 13.8 billion years ago.
5. Craig’s philosophical arguments for the premise “the universe began to exist” just assume that platonism is false. For a complete debunking of those arguments, see this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HoTyezwmsoo. See time-stamp 9:23
6. There are many other problems with the Kalam
2 thoughts on “A summary of the problems with the Kalam Cosmological Argument”
Philosopher of science David Albert has criticised the use of the term ‘nothing’ in describing the quantum vacuum:
“Relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states—no less than giraffes or refrigerators or solar systems—are particular arrangements of elementary physical stuff. The true relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical equivalent to there not being any physical stuff at all isn’t this or that particular arrangement of the fields—what it is (obviously, and ineluctably, and on the contrary) is the simple absence of the fields.”
In your point three “And even if you combine the Kalam argument with the moral argument, all you get is a powerful and good being”. Why would you presume even the moral argument. Aside from the debate of what defines “moral”. Applying an arbitrary moral argument to that being anthromorphizes human concepts of standards which in no way could be presumed.
What would do not kill even mean to an immortal being with no context of dying. Can an immortal being even exist with emotion which would bring meaning to the results of having moral codes?