Divine Hiddenness and Human Sophistry

The Hiddenness Argument claims that if God exists, then there will not exist any instances of nonresistant nonbelief.  Since there are such instances of nonbelief, it follows that God does not exist.

One particular objection to this argument that I find really bad is a move that appeals to free will. The main reason I find this particular objection to be inadequate is that it seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the argument, and this misunderstanding produces an objection that is either a red herring or an equivocation (or both). So, what is the objection? Well, the objection states that nonresistant nonbelief exists because God gave us free will. God wanted to give us free will to decide whether to be in a relationship with him.

However, you can only make a free decision to enter into a relationship with God after you find the proposition “God exists” to be true. In terms of believing certain claims to be true (i.e. belief that), that is not a matter of choice. You can’t just directly choose to believe things by pure will. But you can choose to be in a relationship with God iff (if and only if) you believe that God exists. Thus, there is a distinction between believing that God exists (head knowledge) and believing in God (dedicating your life to God).

Hence, whether or not we have free will, that is irrelevant to forming beliefs about whether or not something is true. And, if God intervenes and presents us with evidence that something is true, he’s not interfering with our free will, unless you assume (implausibly) that beliefs are a choice in the first place!


#Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason #Divine Hiddenness and Human Sophistry #Divine Hiddenness #Divine Hiddenness Argument #Argument from Divine Hiddenness #Divine Hiddenness and Free will #Free will and nonbelief

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