But would God create minds? Would God create finite minds? Would God create human minds? These are good questions.
However, even if we grant that theism predicts human minds, that argument commits the fallacy of understated evidence. The more specific data we are aware of overwhelmingly indicates that the mind is highly (physically) dependent on the brain. The fact that the mind is dependent on the brain is not at all expected on theism. It’s not expected because God is said to be a disembodied mind.
When I say the mind is (physically) dependent on the brain, I’m not even saying that the mind is identical to the brain (although, dependence might be what you would expect on the identity thesis). In addition, while correlations of mental states with physical states don’t entail causation, correlations obviously are evidence of causation. And, antecedently, one wouldn’t predict correlations on dualism. Instead, what we get is ad hoc excuses like “the soul is using the body”, which is an assumption that naturalism doesn’t need.
The evidence that the mind is dependent on the brain is overwhelming. If the mind weren’t dependent, then it would be utterly surprising that caffeine works at all, that lack of sleep causes moodiness, etc. 
Therefore, not only is the dependency of mind surprising on dualism, it is also surprising on theism. For on theism, God is a disembodied mind who is capable of making only souls, and we would expect that precisely because God is a disembodied mind. However, on naturalism, there are no souls. Thus, naturalism entails that there will at least be some type of physical dependency of the mind on the brain (e.g. causal dependency). Theism doesn’t entail this and actually predicts the opposite.
 As a side note, I once had a psychiatrist tell me that he was a substance dualist. This struck me as odd. If dualism were true, we wouldn’t predict that psychiatric medications would work at all. The fact that they stop working in some people is due to tolerance, not some mysterious soul!