Abstract The aim of this paper is to argue that Michael Murray has not offered a successful justifying explanation (or what he calls “CD”) for why God allows animal suffering as it relates to Satan. In other words, Murray’s explanation of animal suffering that invokes Satan is an unsound explanation. The Problem of Animal Suffering …
Continue reading THE PROBLEM OF ANIMAL SUFFERING AND SATAN: RESPONSE TO MICHAEL MURRAY
Plantinga’s EAAN (Evolutionary argument against Naturalism) is an argument which tries to show that one cannot rationally belief both in the truth of metaphysical naturalism and the truth of evolutionary theory. The EAAN does not try and argue that naturalism is false[1], just that it cannot be rationally believed, specifically when combined with the truth …
Does naturalism better explain the fact of ethical disagreement in the world better than theism does? There can be no doubt that there is much disagreement when it comes to ethics. When it comes to normative ethics and meta-ethics, ethicists disagree on a lot of things (i.e. moral realism, divine command theory, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, …
Continue reading An abductive moral argument against God’s existence
There are many dysteleological arguments against the existence of God. Dysteleological arguments are usually put forth against design arguments for God's existence. The project isn't so much to show that God does not exist from these arguments, rather, the point is supposed to be that design arguments aren't any good (or are undermined). Why accept design arguments but …
Continue reading Dysteleological Arguments against God’s existence
In his book, The Hiddenness Argument, J.L. Schellenberg argues that the hiddenness argument trumps arguments for God's existence because the hiddenness argument is a deductive argument. However, according to Schellenberg, arguments for God's existence tend to be inductive. Since the conclusions of deductive arguments necessarily follow from the premises, this trumps the structure of inductive …
Continue reading The argument from divine hiddenness as a deductive argument
On a previous blog post, I talked about the relationship between skeptical theism and the problem of divine hiddenness. Particularly, I argued that skeptical theism (by itself) will not work as a response to the argument from divine hiddenness (i.e. it fails). In that post, I didn't consider every objection, but I have since thought …
Continue reading Skeptical theism and Divine Hiddenness Part 2
Travis Dumsday has recently published a paper arguing that the argument from evil undermines the argument from divine hiddenness. Dumsday's point is that the existence of vast amounts of suffering in the world will possibly make it to where some nonbelievers can't be convinced of God's existence no matter how much evidence God presents to them. Thus, …
Atheist Philosopher Paul Draper seems to not have bought into J.L. Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument. Schellenberg’s argument is that if God exists, then nonresistant nonbelief will not exist. Why? Because if God exists, God would always be open to a relationship with God’s creatures, and the belief that "God exists" is necessary in order to have …
Continue reading Paul Draper and the argument from divine hiddenness
In terms of non-human animals, nothing has been said about them with regards to the problem of divine hiddenness. At least, nobody has formed formulated the hiddenness argument in terms to include animals. Here, I want to show that the problem of divine hiddenness includes animals. Non-human animals in our actual world aren't resistant to …
Continue reading Applying the hiddenness argument to animals
The evidential argument from hell argues that the existence of hell (if it exists) makes God's existence improbable. The argument can be construed as follows: 1. If God exists, God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent 2. (Assumption) Hell exists 3. If God exists, there would be no hell unless hell is necessary in order to bring …
