Can you be both an atheist and an agnostic?

It's common these days to hear that one can be both an atheist and an agnostic. However, even though this position appears nuanced, it actually ends up causing more confusion! When atheism and agnosticism are understood as being mutually exclusive, as they were originally intended, it's my opinion that there is less confusion in conversations about …

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Is saying that some theists are irrational dependent on whether theism is true?

Plantinga says that in order to say that theism is irrational, one must first show that theism is false or that Plantinga's own model of warranted religious belief is false. Hence, Plantinga is saying that the question of rationality is not independent of the question of truth, according to his model. One problem I have …

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The evidential argument from evil, skeptical theism, and the threshold problem

The evidential argument from evil says that the evils we see in our actual world count as good evidence against the existence of God. Rowe's argument, in particular, says that the existence of gratuitous suffering, if it exists, would count as good evidence against God's existence. Skeptical theism is a response to Rowe's argument which …

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THE PROBLEM OF ANIMAL SUFFERING AND SATAN: RESPONSE TO MICHAEL MURRAY

Abstract The aim of this paper is to argue that Michael Murray has not offered a successful justifying explanation (or what he calls “CD”) for why God allows animal suffering as it relates to Satan. In other words, Murray’s explanation of animal suffering that invokes Satan is an unsound explanation. The Problem of Animal Suffering …

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Plantinga’s EAAN and objections

Plantinga’s EAAN (Evolutionary argument against Naturalism) is an argument which tries to show that one cannot rationally belief both in the truth of metaphysical naturalism and the truth of evolutionary theory. The EAAN does not try and argue that naturalism is false[1], just that it cannot be rationally believed, specifically when combined with the truth …

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An abductive moral argument against God’s existence

Does naturalism better explain the fact of ethical disagreement in the world better than theism does? There can be no doubt that there is much disagreement when it comes to ethics. When it comes to normative ethics and meta-ethics, ethicists disagree on a lot of things (i.e. moral realism, divine command theory, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, …

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Dysteleological Arguments against God’s existence

There are many dysteleological arguments against the existence of God. Dysteleological arguments are usually put forth against design arguments for God's existence. The project isn't so much to show that God does not exist from these arguments, rather, the point is supposed to be that design arguments aren't any good (or are undermined). Why accept design arguments but …

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The argument from divine hiddenness as a deductive argument

In his book, The Hiddenness Argument, J.L. Schellenberg argues that the hiddenness argument trumps arguments for God's existence because the hiddenness argument is a deductive argument. However, according to Schellenberg, arguments for God's existence tend to be inductive. Since the conclusions of deductive arguments necessarily follow from the premises, this trumps the structure of inductive …

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Skeptical theism and Divine Hiddenness Part 2

On a previous blog post, I talked about the relationship between skeptical theism and the problem of divine hiddenness. Particularly, I argued that skeptical theism (by itself) will not work as a response to the argument from divine hiddenness (i.e. it fails). In that post, I didn't consider every objection, but I have since thought …

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Reply to Travis Dumsday: Does the argument from evil undermine the hiddenness argument?

Travis Dumsday has recently published a paper arguing that the argument from evil undermines the argument from divine hiddenness. Dumsday's point is that the existence of vast amounts of suffering in the world will possibly make it to where some nonbelievers can't be convinced of God's existence no matter how much evidence God presents to them. Thus, …

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