Evolution, Metaphysics, and Naturalism

Alvin Plantinga argues that if evolution and metaphysical naturalism are both true, then we have no reason to trust our judgments when it comes to metaphysics. Actually, whether or not metaphysical naturalism is true, we shouldn't trust most of the conclusions we reach in metaphysics (or a priori methods; more on that below). One only …

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Of Miracles and Edward Feser

Philosopher Edward Feser has argued on his blog that the prior probability of a miracle occurring has to do with our background knowledge of the world; therefore, there isn't an absurdly low prior probability of a miracle occurring if: God exists, supernaturalism is true, God wants to perform miracles, God wants to raise Jesus from the dead, …

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Response to Alvin Plantinga on Evolution and Theism

In his book, Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga argues that evolution does not conflict with theism, specifically classical theism. Plantinga looks at a few different arguments and concludes they don't work. One of the arguments that Plantinga looks at is an argument from Paul Draper. Draper argues that evolution counts as some evidence against …

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Response to Timothy Perrine on Skeptical Theism and Humean Arguments from Evil

In previous posts, I've discussed skeptical theism and certain types of arguments from evil (i.e. Humean arguments from evil). My contention has been that it is plausible that skeptical theism doesn't apply to certain Humean arguments from evil, particularly Draper-style arguments from evil. Recently, however, Timothy Perrine released a paper where he contests this by …

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On “The Limitations of Pure Skeptical Theism”

In his article, "The Limitations of Pure Skeptical Theism," Paul Draper argues that skeptical theism can't be applied to Humean arguments from evil (like Draper's own argument). To be sure, Draper repeats some of the points that he has made before. Nevertheless, it seems that (many) skeptical theists needed a refresher. Definitions As a reminder, …

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An Evidential Argument from ‘Non-God Objects’

If God exists, would God create anything at all? The problem of non-God objects (PONGO) has to do with the fact that anything exists at all besides the God of classical theism. In other words, if God exists, then only God should exist; God wouldn’t create anything. From Problem to Argument Obviously, this alleged problem can …

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Response to ‘Capturing Christianity’ on “The Conflict Between Natural Theology and Skeptical Theism”

Cameron Bertuzzi of "Capturing Christianity" recently wrote an interesting post on the alleged conflict between skeptical theism and natural theology (i.e. arguments for God's existence). Undergirding the skeptical theist position is the idea that (on classical theism) God's reasons for allowing and doing various things, especially in particular instances, are unknown. There are various forms of skeptical …

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