Ramified Natural Theology And The Ascension of Christ

I’ve previously brought up an objection to “the” Argument From The Resurrection, specifically as it relates to William Lane Craig’s version of the argument. My objection centered on the fact that Craig cherry-picks or ignores facts that don’t fit his resurrection hypothesis–or don’t fit the resurrection hypothesis better than an alternative hypothesis. One such fact …

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Some more thoughts on the argument from contingency

This past Saturday, the Unbelievable? podcast hosted a debate between Cosmic Skeptic and Cameron Bertuzzi on the subject of the argument from contingency (for God's existence) [1]. That got me to thinking about writing another post on the argument, and this post is just going to list and discuss just some of the problems I find …

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Does atheism generate predictions about the world?

By 'atheism', I mean what is commonly referred to as 'strong atheism'. Strong atheism is the position that gods do not exist. Specifically, strong atheism can also be local. In other words, classical strong atheism is the denial of classical/traditional theism. And classical/traditional theism is the position that there exists a God who is all-powerful, …

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The Argument from Biblical Confusion against Christianity

What exactly do I mean by biblical confusion? Basically, I mean that Christians have varying interpretations (i.e. disagreement) about what the Bible says. Moreover, there are some/many passages in the Bible that are ambiguous and vague. The fact that there is so much confusion around the Bible is surprising if Christianity is true; however, this …

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Stop saying that it’s ‘obvious’ that God exists

One of the problems with claiming that something is obviously true is that it's basically a non-starter. That is, just because you saying something is just obviously the case, that does not mean that it really is. But what is the claim being made? Saying that something is obvious must mean that it is obvious …

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Evolution, Metaphysics, and Naturalism

Alvin Plantinga argues that if evolution and metaphysical naturalism are both true, then we have no reason to trust our judgments when it comes to metaphysics. Actually, whether or not metaphysical naturalism is true, we shouldn't trust most of the conclusions we reach in metaphysics (or a priori methods; more on that below). One only …

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Of Miracles and Edward Feser

Philosopher Edward Feser has argued on his blog that the prior probability of a miracle occurring has to do with our background knowledge of the world; therefore, there isn't an absurdly low prior probability of a miracle occurring if: God exists, supernaturalism is true, God wants to perform miracles, God wants to raise Jesus from the dead, …

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Response to Alvin Plantinga on Evolution and Theism

In his book, Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga argues that evolution does not conflict with theism, specifically classical theism. Plantinga looks at a few different arguments and concludes they don't work. One of the arguments that Plantinga looks at is an argument from Paul Draper. Draper argues that evolution counts as some evidence against …

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Response to Timothy Perrine on Skeptical Theism and Humean Arguments from Evil

In previous posts, I've discussed skeptical theism and certain types of arguments from evil (i.e. Humean arguments from evil). My contention has been that it is plausible that skeptical theism doesn't apply to certain Humean arguments from evil, particularly Draper-style arguments from evil. Recently, however, Timothy Perrine released a paper where he contests this by …

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On “The Limitations of Pure Skeptical Theism”

In his article, "The Limitations of Pure Skeptical Theism," Paul Draper argues that skeptical theism can't be applied to Humean arguments from evil (like Draper's own argument). To be sure, Draper repeats some of the points that he has made before. Nevertheless, it seems that (many) skeptical theists needed a refresher. Definitions As a reminder, …

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An Evidential Argument from ‘Non-God Objects’

If God exists, would God create anything at all? The problem of non-God objects (PONGO) has to do with the fact that anything exists at all besides the God of classical theism. In other words, if God exists, then only God should exist; God wouldn’t create anything. From Problem to Argument Obviously, this alleged problem can …

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Response to ‘Capturing Christianity’ on “The Conflict Between Natural Theology and Skeptical Theism”

Cameron Bertuzzi of "Capturing Christianity" recently wrote an interesting post on the alleged conflict between skeptical theism and natural theology (i.e. arguments for God's existence). Undergirding the skeptical theist position is the idea that (on classical theism) God's reasons for allowing and doing various things, especially in particular instances, are unknown. There are various forms of skeptical …

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A Probabilistic Argument from Divine Hiddenness

In the literature, 'divine hiddenness' doesn't mean that God exists and is hiding. Rather, what it primarily means is that there are some individuals who don't believe that God exists, and their nonbelief isn't merely the result of emotional factors towards the concept of God. In addition, 'divine hiddenness' is sometimes used to refer to …

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William Lane Craig: An objection and response to Bill Craig’s cosmological argument for God’s existence

For the Kalam Argument, Bill Craig says that his argument is subject to the criticism that the cause of the universe might not exist anymore.Could this possibly be true? MaybeLikely? I don't think so.The cause that Craig discovers from the argument is that this cause is:Timeless, spaceless, immaterial, eternal, unchanging, personal. and uncaused.I think it …

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