An Evidential Argument from Non-God Objects: Part 2

In a previous post I talked about how any non-God object (and/or objects) is evidence against classical theism. My argument is as follows: 1. It is a known fact that (concrete) reality consists of some thing(s) that is/are not God 2. (1) is more expected on the hypothesis of metaphysical naturalism than on the hypothesis of …

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The Problem of Non-God objects

The problem of non-God objects (PONGO) has to do with the fact that anything exists at all besides God. In other words, if God exists, then only God should exist; God wouldn't create anything. Obviously, this alleged problem can be turned into an argument (and indeed it has). Here is the argument: Proposition P1: If the …

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