Does atheism generate predictions about the world?

By 'atheism', I mean what is commonly referred to as 'strong atheism'. Strong atheism is the position that gods do not exist. Specifically, strong atheism can also be local. In other words, classical strong atheism is the denial of classical/traditional theism. And classical/traditional theism is the position that there exists a God who is all-powerful, …

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Deformed Epistemology, confidence, and reflective awareness

I commonly refer to reformed epistemology as "deformed epistemology" because it quite apparently lowers the bar for what constitutes epistemic justification/warrant. For one thing, it appears to be more of a defensive posture that isn't out to seek the truth, or it isn't out to look for what are the most reliable ways of coming …

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Objections to “Warranted Christian Belief”

Alvin Plantinga defends the notion that if God exists, then God can probably be known in a properly basic way. Moreover, if Yahweh exists, then Yahweh can probably be known in a properly basic way. Crucial to Plantinga's model of warrant (i.e. the property that makes true belief knowledge) is epistemic externalism. However, for all …

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The superfluousness of reformed epistemology and other problems

Reformed epistemology emphasizes that a theist (or Christian in particular) can have epistemic justification for their belief in God, but the justification doesn't have to be by way of argument or external/independent evidence. I say "external evidence" because reformed epistemology is not fideism; it might be better to describe one as having "grounds" for their …

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