In a previous post I talked about how any non-God object (and/or objects) is evidence against classical theism. My argument is as follows:
1. It is a known fact that (concrete) reality consists of some thing(s) that is/are not God
2. (1) is more expected on the hypothesis of metaphysical naturalism than on the hypothesis of classical theism
3. The intrinsic probability of metaphysical naturalism is equal to that of classical theism
4. Therefore, other evidence held equal, classical theism is probably false
I then went on to say:
“If naturalism is true, there is a (natural) reality with no God. If classical theism is true, then God exists; however, it is an open question whether God would create anything at all. Thus, naturalism entails that there will be a part of reality that is not Divine, whereas theism doesn’t entail that there will be anything other than God.  Thus, the fact that there exist some entities other than God (if God exists) is evidence against God’s existence”
I want to clarify what I meant in this previously written paragraph. I’m mainly focused on concrete reality instead of abstract reality. Concrete reality consists of chairs, people, trees, phones, staplers, computers, universes, the cosmos, etc. If, for example, Platonism is true and the number ‘3’ exists, then God can’t do anything about that. Hence, it’s unclear how the existence of abstract objects would lower the probability of a God existing, but one could still try to run a logical/conceptual argument against God’s existence (based on the existence of abstract objects….if they exist).
The same cannot be said of concrete objects. If naturalism is true, then there must be a concrete reality apart from God. Hence, there must also be some part of concrete reality that is not God. In other words, ‘none’ entails ‘not some’. If there are no A’s, then there are (surely) not some A’s. Naturalism entails a concrete reality without God, whereas classical theism doesn’t entail this. In fact, one might expect that God wouldn’t create anything because God is perfect goodness with unlimited knowledge and power. God would plausibly be satisfied with just herself; hence, while- for all we know- God would want to create something, it is also true that (for all we know) God will not want create anything. If God creating stuff entails (or makes likely) that there will exist things like horrific suffering; unbelief; dystelelogy; religious confusion; finite beings, etc., then that’s a good reason not to create stuff in the first place.
I responded to the objection that God had to create something. My response was that even if that’s plausible, it’s not known to be true but on naturalism it is (known to be true). Here in this post I also want to say: adding an auxiliary hypothesis to classical theism to explain why some concrete reality exists apart from God is less simple than the naturalistic hypothesis.
Thus, naturalism is a better explanation than theism for the existence of non-divine objects. If you can think of any good objections, then you can post them down in the comments. I’ll respond in (upcoming) part 3.